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Abstract
Both human capital accumulation and Lazear contracts can explain the rais-
ing wage of salary/wage worker through job experience or tenure. To distin-
guish between these two effects, Lazear and Moore (1984) used self-employed
workers’ wage growth to partial out the effect of human capital accumulation
from salary/wage workers’ wage growth. When the human capital accumu-
lation behavior is identical across two kinds of jobs, the difference in wage
growth between salary/wage workers and self-employed workers are due to
Lazear contract since self-employed workers’ wage are determined by their
productivity. However, in the model developed in this paper, when self-
employed workers face more wage variation but enjoy a higher return for
human capital, human capital accumulation for those two kinds of jobs are
shown to be different. The model predicts that workers with higher human
capital select to be self-employed. Under general assumptions on human
capital production technology, workers with high human capital have flatter
wage-experience profile as a result of optimal human capital accumulation.
Thus the heterogeneity of salary/wage and self-employed workers that in-
duces a different pattern of human capital accumulation can explain the
observed lower wage growth of self-employed workers inLazear and Moore
(1984).
1 Introduction
Worker’s wage growth with work experience is one of the most robust empir-
ical findings in economics. Lazear (1979) and Lazear (1981) explained wage
growth among salary/wage workers based on principal-agent theory. In his
model, worker’s behavior is not perfectly observed and worker’s shirking is
detected only by chance. In Lazear model, it is optimal for an employer to
pay his employee less than the worker’s marginal product when the worker
is young and more than the worker’s marginal product when the worker is
old. The employer takes the difference between marginal product and wage
when worker is young and returns it to the worker when the worker is old.
This payment system discourages workers from shirking since the worker is
fired when the shirking is detected and thus cannot take his money back.
A difficulty of testing this theory is that the human capital theory also pre-
dicts wage growth with work experience because of worker’s skill formation.
Since Lazear theory and human capital theory are not mutually exclusive, it
is very difficult to attribute the observed wage growth to the specific theory.
As an indirect test of Lazear theory, Lazear and Moore (1984) compared
wage growth of salary/wage workers and self-employed workers. Since self-
employed workers do not have an incentive to shirk, the wage growth of
self-employed workers can be attributed to the human capital accumulation.
Assuming identical human capital accumulation between salary/wage (SW)
workers and self-employed (SE) workers, the difference of wage growth be-
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tween SW workers and SE workers can be attributed to Lazear theory. In fact
Lazear and Moore (1984) found the steeper wage-experience profile among
SW workers than SE workers and used the finding as a supporting evidence
of Lazear theory.
The purpose of this paper is to propose the model that predicts the flatter
wage-experience profile among SE workers only based on the human capi-
tal theory. To develop the model, two crucial aspects of self-employment
that differentiate self-employment from salary/wage job are considered. As
mentioned in many studies (Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), Kanbur (1982),
Carrington et al. (1996), and Cressy (2000)), one important aspect of self-
employment is the larger variation in income compared with SW workers. On
the other hand, there is a premium for self-employment as shown in the em-
pirical study in this paper. Only the entrepreneur with high human capital
can enjoy this premium for long period, though. Bates (1990) found the high
human capital of entrepreneurs as a critical factor of small business longevity.
In addition, Borjas and Bronars (1989) and Fairlie and Meyer (1996) report
higher return to education among SE workers than SW workers using Census
data. We interpret these findings as evidence of the higher return for human
capital among SE workers. To summarize, we assume that higher risk and
higher return for human capital characterize SE workers.
Modeling these two characteristics of the wage determination with work-
ers’ risk aversion, workers’ optimal human capital investment decision pro-
duces a steeper wage profile among SW workers, as Lazear and Moore (1984)
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observed. Due to the different characteristics of SE jobs and SW jobs, SE
workers are not necessarily a good ‘control group’ for the SW workers.
In the model, the workers choose to be SW or SE workers when they finish
their schooling. Since to be SE is risky, the worker with high human capital
selects SE since for these people the higher return for human capital com-
pensates the risk. Using a standard human capital accumulation technology
as in Lucas (1988), we can show that the optimal human capital investment
is a function of current human capital level. Current human capital has a
positive effect on human capital investment since a worker with high human
capital is more efficient in additional human capital production. On the
other hand, the opportunity cost of human capital investment is higher for a
worker with high human capital. Under the convexity assumption of human
capital production, we can show that the latter effect dominates the former
effect. As a result, a worker with high human capital invests less in his hu-
man capital. Thus SE workers, who have higher human capital as a result of
self-selection, tend to have a flatter wage profile compared with SW workers
because of the different human capital investment behavior. We also show
that the SW workers who will select SE in later periods tend to invest more
in their human capital than the SW workers who plan to stay in SW jobs.
In sum, SE workers invest less in their human capital on average because of
two characteristics of self-employment, which are high-income risk and high
return for their human capital.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Since the wage risk
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of self- employment is a crucial assumption for our main conclusion, the
next section examines the wage risk for self-employed workers. The model of
human capital accumulation under the income risk is introduced in the third
section. The fourth section provides evidences consistent with our model.
The conclusion follows.
2 Replication of Lazear and Moore (1984)’s
result and wage risk of self- employed work-
ers
2.1 The model and estimation
In this section, we replicate the result obtained in Lazear and Moore (1984)
using a different data set; we then test to see if the wages of SE workers
are more volatile than the wage of SW workers. Since we are interested in
the wage variation faced by an individual, residuals from fixed-effect wage
regression are used to create a measure of wage variation.
Data for the years 1985 to 1998 were taken from NLSY79. The sample is
restricted to white male and is used to estimate the model:
lnwit = Xitβ1 + sitXitβ2 + ci + uit, (1)
where wit is hourly wage rate and Xit is a vector of standard control vari-
ables in Mincer type wage equation1, sit is a dummy variable which takes
one if the worker is self-employed and ci is individual heterogeneity. The
1The variables included in the regression appear in Table 1. The variable names are
self-explanatory.
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interaction with the self-employed dummy is included to replicate Lazear
and Moore (1984)’s findings and to avoid systematic correlation of uit with
self-employment status. The model is estimated by both pooled OLS and
fixed effect2. The estimation results appear in the first and second column in
table 1. The results of the fixed effect regression, which appear in the second
column of table 1, shows that SE workers earn 23.5% more ceteris paribus.
The return to experience among SE workers (about 7% for the first year) is
almost half of SW workers’ (about 12% for the first year). In addition, there
is almost no return to tenure among SE workers while SW workers enjoy a
return of 3.2% for the first year of tenure. These results almost match with
the Lazear and Moore (1984)’s findings. This might be because of the Lazear
contract or less on-the-job human capital investment among SE workers. In
sum, SE workers earn higher wages and experience less wage growth, ceteris
paribus.
Then using the residual of the previous fixed effect estimation,
uˆ2it = Xitγ1 + sitXitγ2 + ai + vit, (2)
is estimated using both OLS and fixed effect estimation3. We are interested
in the null hypothesis:
H0 : γ2 = 0.
The results of the multiple regression, along with the simple regression, ap-
pear in table 1. By using the results of the simple regression, we can say that
2The assumption E[uit|Xi., si., ci] = 0 is posed here.
3Essentially this is Breush-Pagan’s test for heteroscedasticity.
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the conditional wage variance among SE workers is twice or three times larger
than that of the salaried workers. To avoid the possibility that the result is
derived from the correlation of self-employment status with the other factors
that affect wage volatility, a multiple regression is also estimated. The null
hypothesis of no difference in the coefficients is rejected through F-test. Also
the results are essentially the same for both OLS and fixed-effect. From these
evidences, we can conclude that being self-employed is more risky than being
a SW worker.
2.2 The issues of measurement error
There is a possible flaw with the previous analysis due to measurement error
in the wage of self-employed workers. Smaller return to experience and tenure
among SE workers may be due to measurement error in the wage of SE that
is systematically correlated with experience or tenure. It is also likely that
larger conditional variance of wage among SE workers is due to measure-
ment error. Joulfaian and Rider (1998) report that SE workers underreport
their income by 18% on average using the data from Tax Payer Compliance
Measurement Program data collected by the IRS. Although respondents do
not have an incentive to avoid taxation by underreporting their income in
the case of NLSY, the underreporting is still possible since the respondents
may refer to their 1040 form to report their income to NLSY. Thus it is
worth discussing the issues of measurement error explicitly. The model with
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measurement error is assumed to be following.
lnw∗it = Xitβ1 + sitXitβ2 + ci + eit, (3)
lnwit = lnw∗it + di + biselfit + uit, (4)
where di is an individual specific tendency of misreport regardless of employ-
ment status and bi is an individual specific tendency of misreport of wage
when the respondent is self-employed. The assumptions that these individual
tendencies are time-invariant are crucial in the following discussion. These
tendencies (bi, di, ) and errors in equations (eit, uit) are assumed not to be
correlated. The assumptions on error terms are following:
E[eit|bi, ci, di, Xi, selfi] = 0,
E[uit|bi, ci, di, Xi, selfi] = 0
and
E[e2it|bi, ci, di, Xi, selfi] = (1 + φselfit)σ2e .
To test if self-employed worker faces the larger risk, we are interested in if
φ = 0. The model that is actually estimated is
lnwit = Xitβ1 + sitXitβ2 + ci + eit + di + biselfit + uit. (5)
Applying fixed effect transformation, we obtain
wit− w¯i = (Xit− X¯i)β1+(sitXit− siXi)β2+ eit+uit+ bi(selfit− ¯selfit) (6)
In this situation, fixed effect estimator is not consistent estimator since
plim ˆβself = βself + b, where b = E(bi).Thus fixed effect estimator of βself
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estimates the lower bound of βself given b < 0. In this case, the SE premium
found in the regression should be understood as the lower bound estimate.
Another possible measurement error arises from the differential concept
on the income between SW workers and SE workers. SE workers may report
return for physical capital of their own business as their wage; also they may
subtract the cost of physical investment in their own business from their own
wage. It is likely that SE workers invest in physical capital when they start
their business and collect the return later. Then the wages of short tenured
SE workers are understated and the wages of long tenured SE workers are
overstated. Thus the error term of the measurement error
E(uit|bi, ci, di, Xi., selfi.) = biselfit + aiselfittenureit, (7)
where bi ≤ 0, ai ≥ 0, becomes a possible case. As a result the probability
limit of fixed effect estimators are
plim ˆβself = βself + b, plim ˆβselftenure = βselftenure + a, (8)
where a = Eai. Therefore ˆβself is likely to be a lower bound estimator of
βself and ˆβselftenure is likely to be an upper bound estimator of βselftenure.
Therefore neither of these inconsistencies weakens our discussion. We still
conclude that SE workers earn higher wage and SE workers experience less
wage growth.
The conditional variance of measurement error may also depend on the
self-employment status since the measurement error depends more on indi-
viduals among SE workers compared with SW workers thorough the effect
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of bi. Define vit = eit + uit + bi(selfit − ¯selfit). Then
E[v2|Xit, i] = (1 + φselfit)σ2e + σ2u + E[b2i (selfit − ¯selfi)2]. (9)
The last term tells us that the job status changer tends to have a larger
variance. However, the last term of this expression is constant for each
individual, so when we regress the squared residual of fixed effect estimation
of wage equation (1) on self employment status using the fixed effect, we
obtain the consistent estimator of φ. Thus the coefficient of self-employment
status found in column 5 of table 1 (0.189 with s.e. of 0.038) is understood
as an estimate of φ. Therefore, we still conclude that the self-employment is
twice as risky as being a wage-salary worker under the assumption that the
tendency to misreport is constant within individual and job status.
3 The model
Suppose each worker lives for two periods. Each worker is endowed with
one unit of time for each period. Each worker knows his ability at the first
period. Each worker has the following preference with constant absolute risk
aversion.
Uˆi = − exp[−γi(wi1 + wi2)] (10)
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where γi is the degree of absolute risk aversion of worker i and wit is the wage
offer for worker i at time t4. The wage offer depends on job choice, whether
the worker is the self-employed or salaried worker. The wage offer for each
job is
witSE = bSE(1− nit)hit + eitSE, eitSE ∼ N(0, σ2SE), (11)
and
witSW = bSW (1− nit)hit + eitSW , eitSW ∼ N(0, σ2SW ), (12)
where hit is the human capital of worker i at period t, nit ∈ [0, 1] is the portion
of time devoted to the human capital accumulation by the worker i at time t.
The initial human capital hi1 is given as an endowment for each worker. This
initial level of human capital includes human capital accumulated through
education and innate ability. Although we recognize the endogeneity of the
educational decision, we treat this as given since the main interest of our
analysis here is on-the-job human capital accumulation. The human capital
for both periods is assumed to be general across the jobs. The parameter bj,
which is exogenously given by the labor market for the workers, is the unit
price of human capital in job j. The random variable eitj is a shock to the
wage. We assume eitj is independently distributed across individual, time
4Although the utility function is not defined over consumption, this ‘indirect’ utility
function is the solution of a problem such as
max
c1,c2
− exp[−γ( α
α+ β
)−α( β
α+ β
)−βcα1 c
β
2 ],
subject to
c1 + c2 = w1 + w2.
The crucial assumption is that the workers do not face the liquidity constraint.
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and two jobs. By taking expectation of the life-time utility, we obtain
ˆEUit =
∫ ∫
− exp[−γi(wi1 + wi2)]dF (ei1j)dG(ei2j)
= −
∫
exp[γi(bjhi1(1− ni1) + eij1)]dF (eij1)
·
∫
exp[γi(bjhi2(1− ni2) + eij2)]dG(eij2)
= − exp[−γi(bj(1− ni1)hi1 − (γi/2)σ2j
+bjhi2 − (γi/2)σ2j )]. (13)
The independence of error terms across periods derives the second line and
the property of log normal distribution induces the third line5. Using the
ordinal property of utility function,
EU = bj(1− ni1)hi1 − (γi/2)σ2j + bj(1− ni2)hi2 − (γi/2)σ2j , (14)
is a equivalent expression of (13). Each worker has access to the following
human capital accumulation technology.
hi2 = hi1 + δ(ni1hi1)α, α ∈ (0, 1), (15)
where δ is efficiency of human capital investment on human capital accu-
mulation6. The parameter α represents a worker’s learning ability which
is assumed to be identical for all the workers. This technology shows that
the worker with higher human capital is more efficient in the production of
additional human capital, but the effect diminishes since α ∈ (0, 1).
5When lnx ∼ N(m, s2), it is known that Ex = exp(m + (1/2)s2). In our case, e =
lnx ∼ N(m, s2) thus E exp(e) = Ex = exp(m+ (1/2)s2).
6This functional form of human capital accumulation is standard in the literature of
macroeconomics. See Lucas (1988).
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Each worker maximizes his lifetime expected utility by choosing ni1 and
a career path ({j}2t=1) under constraint of human capital accumulation tech-
nology7.
Now we are going to make two assumptions that distinguish SW and SE
workers.
Assumption 1 σ2SE > σ
2
SW .
i.e. the wages for SE workers are more volatile than those of SW workers’.
The empirical evidence supports this assumption as seen in the previous
section.
Assumption 2 bSE > bSW .
i.e. the return for human capital is higher for self-employed workers.
This assumption is justified by the robust finding of the premium for the
self-employment found in table 1 and this premium can be enjoyed given
that the worker can remain self-employed. Whereas the failure rate of self-
employment is very high (Bates (1990), Schiller and Crewson (1997)) and
Bates (1990) found high human capital of entrepreneur as a critical determi-
nant of small business longevity. Thus the worker with high human capital
exclusively enjoys the SE premium. In other word, we assume that the return
for human capital is higher for SE workers. Also empirical studies which use
census data report higher return to education among SE workers than SW
7As a result of optimization, ni2 = 0 is trivially chosen.
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workers (Borjas and Bronars (1989) and Fairlie and Meyer (1996)).
Under these assumptions, we will solve the worker’s maximization prob-
lem for each possible career path and calculate the corresponding indirect
utility function. Each worker chooses a career path that yields the highest
lifetime utility. Since we can rule out the possible career path of SE - SW8,
we should consider three possible career paths of SE - SE, SW - SW, and
SW - SE.
Each worker solves
max
{{jt}2t=1,ni1}
EU = bj(1− ni1)hi1 − (γi/2)σ2j + bjhi2 − (γi/2)σ2j , (16)
subject to
hi2 = hi1 + δ(ni1hi1)α, α ∈ (0, 1), (17)
given hi1.
The optimal human capital investment time, ni1, is
ni1 =
 (δα)
1
1−αh−1i1 , for job stayers.
( bSEbSW )
1
1−α (δα)
1
1−αh−1i1 , for job changers.
(18)
These solutions show the human capital investment time is decreasing in
the initial human capital. There are two factors that relate the initial human
capital level and human capital investment. First, from (17) the worker with
higher human capital is more productive in human capital accumulation.
This effect is diminishing because the term (ni1hi1) is exponentiated by α ∈
(0, 1). Second, the worker with higher human capital pays more opportunity
8This career path is always dominated by the SW - SE from the assumption 2.
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cost of human capital investment, which is bjni1hi1. Therefore marginal
benefit of investment diminishes in hi1 but marginal cost is constant in hi1,
thus the worker with high hi1 chooses lower ni1. The assumption of the
convexity of human capital production, α ∈ (0, 1) is the crucial assumption
to derive this result, after all. To summarize, under the assumption of convex
human capital production technology, the worker with higher initial human
capital devotes less time in his human capital investment.
By substituting the optimal ni1 in the objective function of each career
path, we obtain the following indirect utility functions for each career path
for each individual i.
vSE−SE(hi1, γi) = 2bSEhi1 − γiσ2SE + bSEδ 11−α (α α1−α − α 11−α ) (19)
vSW−SW (hi1, γi) = 2bSWhi1 − γiσ2SW + bSW δ 11−α (α α1−α − α 11−α ) (20)
vSW−SE(hi1, γi) = (bSW + bSE)hi1 − (γi/2)(σ2SW + σ2SE)
+b
−α
1−α
SW b
1
1−α
SE δ
1
1−α (α
α
1−α − α 11−α ) (21)
These expressions tell us that the choice of career path depends on each
worker’s first period human capital and the degree of risk aversion. From
the first two expressions, we can clearly see that the worker with high hi1
is likely to be the SE worker. Those less risk adverse workers (the workers
with low γi) are likely to choose self-employment. The relationship between
lifetime utility for each career path and initial human capital is graphed in
figure 1 given the degree of risk aversion. This graph shows the lifetime
utility of being a SE worker is higher than being a SW worker for the high
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human capital worker. In addition, the graph shows that the worker with
the ‘medium’ level of human capital switches the job in the middle of his
career. The increasing risk aversion (γ) increases the distance of intercepts
and makes the choice of self-employment less likely.
The worker with higher initial human capital selects self-employment.
How does this selection affect the wage growth of SE and SW workers? The
‘average’ wage growth for each career path is9,
gSE−SE =
Ew2SE
Ew1SE
=
hi1 + δ1/(1−α)αα/(1−α)
hi1 − δ1/(1−α)α1/(1−α) , (22)
gSW−SW =
Ew2SW
Ew1SW
=
hi1 + δ1/(1−α)αα/(1−α)
hi1 − δ1/(1−α)α1/(1−α) , (23)
gSW−SE =
Ew2SE
Ew1SW
=
bSE
bSW
hi1 + δ1/(1−α)((bSE/bSW )α)α/(1−α)
hi1 − δ1/(1−α)((bSE/bSW )α)1/(1−α) . (24)
Interestingly, if the initial human capital is given, the wage profile of the
SE and the SW workers are identical since gSE−SE = gSW−SW . This growth
rate decreases and converges to one as hi1 increases. This is because the time
devoted to human capital accumulation, ni1, is decreasing in initial human
capital, hi1. However what we observe is gSE−SE < gSW−SW because the
SE worker’s initial human capital, hi1, is higher than SW worker’s. Thus
the observed difference of the wage profile is the result of heterogeneity of
workers in the initial human capital. The wage growth of the job changer is
higher than the stayers’ wage growth. The opportunity cost of human capital
investment is low while being a SW worker but the return of the accumulated
9Although expected value of a ratio is not a ratio of expected values, this measure gives
us a rough idea.
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human capital is higher since he becomes a SE worker in the second period.
The low opportunity cost of the human capital investment and the high
return for the accumulated human capital encourages the investment. Thus,
among SW workers, prospective job changers invest more in their human
capital compared with prospective job stayers.
Now, we continue our analysis using a numerical example. From the em-
pirical findings in the previous section, we assume the variance of the wages of
self-employed workers is three times as large as the salaried workers’. The re-
turn for the human capital among self-employed workers is three times larger
than the salaried workers’ according to assumption 2. The learning parameter
is chosen such that convexity of human capital production is satisfied. Since
we know little about the degree of risk aversion, the parameter of risk aversion
was chosen such that a plausible result can be obtained. The parameters are
assumed to be α = 0.3, γ = 15, bSE = 3, bSW = 1, σ2SE = 3, σ
2
SW = 1, δ = 0.9.
The simulation result appears in figure 2 to 4. It is worth noting that the
absolute value of the indirect utility does not mean anything. Only the order
matters. From figure 2, we see that the worker with low human capital in
the first period selects the career path of SW - SW. The worker with high
human capital chooses the career path of SE - SE. The worker with medium
level of the initial human capital chooses the career path of SW - SE.
In figure 3 the wage growth of the job stayer is drawn. As discussed before,
although the wage growth of SE workers and SW workers are the same for
each level of human capital, what we observe is the high wage growth for SW
16
workers and the low wage growth for SE workers. However this observation
is simply because of the worker’s heterogeneity of the initial human capital.
In figure 4 the wage growth of career changer is drawn. We can confirm the
wage growth of the career changer is higher than the stayer’s.
4 Supporting evidence of the model
4.1 SE workers have higher human capital
The theory discussed in the previous section predicts that the worker with
higher human capital selects self-employment. With respect to the observ-
able characteristics, several studies observe that the worker with high edu-
cation is more likely to be self-employed (Borjas and Bronars (1989), Evans
and Leighton (1989)). Also Bates (1990) reports that the high educational
attainment of an entrepreneur is the critical determinant of small business
longevity.
Borjas and Bronars (1989) observed the positive selection into SE among
white males based on unobservable heterogeneity when they estimated wage
equation with Heckman style selection correction assuming bivariate normal
error term. The reduction of the SE premium in the fixed effect estimation
relative to the SE premium in the OLS estimation in our empirical analysis
also suggests positive correlation of (unobserved) individual heterogeneity
and self-employment status.
It is a stylized fact that the worker who has a self-employed father is more
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likely to be a SE worker even after controlling for the inheritance10 (Lindh
and Ohlsson (1996) Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Hout and Rosen (1999)
and Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000)).
Among the studies, Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) emphasize the impor-
tance of the intergenerational transmission of human capital rather than the
mitigated liquidity constraint to explain this finding, since they found very
large effect of the parent’s self-employment status on the son’s selection into
self-employment even after controlling the amount of parent’s asset. They
also found that the son of a successful self-employed worker is likely to be
self-employed. From this finding, they conclude that the transmission of hu-
man capital is the important channel to explain intergenerational correlation
of self-employment status. In addition, they did not find a stronger intergen-
erational correlation of occupation among self-employed workers. Thus, they
speculate, the human capital that is transferred from the parents to their
son is non-occupational specific human capital. Although their findings may
imply the transmission of human capital that is specific to the SE, the the-
oretical discussion made in this paper still holds since the worker with ‘any
kind of’ higher human capital experience lower wage growth. These results
support the prediction of our model; the self-employed workers experience
lower wage growth because of higher initial human capital.
The model also predicts that some of the workers plan to be self-employed
10By controlling inheritance, the researchers try to partial out the effect of liquidity
constraint.
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in the middle of their career. Several studies show that probability to be self-
employed is an increasing function of age (Borjas and Bronars (1989), Evans
and Leighton (1989), and Schiller and Crewson (1997)). This finding is a very
robust finding that is observed in any empirics to explain SE status. The
workers who plan to be SE in the future prepares for the time by acquiring
skill through OJT in the firm, thus when the worker become SE the worker
is already well prepared and does not have strong incentive to acquire more
skill due to high opportunity cost resulting from high human capital.
As a bottom line, several empirical studies support the prediction of the
model; the worker with the higher human capital is more likely to be self-
employed.
Also the model predicts that the planned job changers accumulate more
human capital while they are a salaried worker compare with the other
salaried workers who plan to stay11. Lazear’s model does not predict this
since the wage profile of salaried worker is identical regardless of future
plan12. We can test this prediction and use the result of this test as sup-
porting evidence for the model. The prediction is tested using the following
econometric model.
lnwit = Xitβ0 + β1fselfit + β2expitfselfit + β3exp2itfselfit
11Remember, (18) shows the planned job changer devotes more time in human capital
accumulation relative to the stayers. Also the planned job changer has higher human
capital compared with the planned job stayer.
12If the employer predicts the worker’s quit in the near future, the employer may offer
a steeper profile to extract the worker’s effort. However this explanation is rather tricky,
since the employer who notices the worker’s plan to quit can fire the worker immediately
to prevent him from shirking before he quits.
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+β4tenitfselfit + β5ten2itfselfit + ci + uit, (25)
where the dummy variable fselfit is an indicator which takes one if the
worker will be self-employed in the future at time t13. This model is esti-
mated by OLS and fixed effect using the sample of salaried workers under
the assumption
E[uit|ci, Xi., expi., fselfi., selfi. = 0] = 0.
The null hypothesis that we are interested in is
H0 : β2 = 0,
against
H1 : β2 > 0.
If the null is rejected, it imply that the prospective job changer accumulate
more human capital through OJT.
The regression results are in Table 2. For both OLS and fixed effect,
the return to experience is 20%-50%higher for the prospective self-employed
worker. The return to tenure is the same for the prospective self-employed
workers and stayers. If we interpret the return to experience as the return
for general human capital, this result is consistent with the prediction of
the model. The workers who plan to be SE in the future try to accumulate
general human capital before embarking upon a dangerous undertaking.
13Here we assume the perfect foresight as in the theoretical model. If we assume the
rational expectation model, the estimated coefficient is subject to the attenuation bias. In
this case we are estimating the lower bound of the effect.
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4.2 Both winner and loser select SE?
The model predicts a very simple selection rule; the worker with high human
capital selects SE. A sensible criticism for this prediction is that there are
two kinds of SE workers. The first kind is an eligible entrepreneur and the
second kind is the SE worker who is not qualified to work for the firm and
forced to work by himself. If this story describes the real world, it is not
surprising that the latter group experience less wage growth since the less
eligible worker has less learning ability and experiences less wage growth.
Could we observe this kind of ‘two tail selection rule’ among SE workers?
To examine this possibility, we study the distribution of ability among
self-employed and wage-salary workers. If there are ‘two tail selection rule’
among SE workers, we should find bimodal distribution of ability among SE
workers that have two peaks at high and low ability. As a proxy for the ability
we use AFQT89 (Armed Force Qualifying Test) score that is contained in
NLSY 79. The result of kernel density estimation of the distribution of test
score for the SE and SW workers appears in figure 5. Comparing two panels,
we find bimodal distribution among SW workers rather than SE workers.
The workers with high scores and low scores select SW. The distribution of
ability among SE workers is rather unimodal. Although it is not clear why
the distribution of ability among SW workers is bimodal, this evidence shows
that ‘two tail selection rule’ among SE workers are unlikely.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper the human capital accumulation by self-employed (SE) and
salaried and wage (SW) workers was analyzed. Under the assumptions that
the wages of SE workers are more volatile than salaried workers’ and the
wages of SE workers more sharply reflect their human capital, SE workers
invest less in their human capital because of their higher initial human cap-
ital. This difference in human capital investment behavior results in the
flatter wage profile for SE than SW workers. This theory was indirectly
supported by the empirical facts about self-employed workers.
The model shows that the self-employed workers are not necessarily a
good ‘control’ group to test the Lazear contract, since not only the incentive
effect of the Lazear contract produces the steeper wage profile of salaried
workers, the difference of human capital investment does as well. This con-
clusion does not deny the existence of the Lazear contract, nor the result of
Lazear and Moore (1984). However simply attributing the difference of wage
profiles to the incentive effect of the Lazear contract may overestimate the
importance of the Lazear contract.
A more direct test of this theory, such as the estimation of human capital
investment function, is left for future research.
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Table 1 The replication of the Lazear and Moore (1984)’s finding and
the risk of self-employed workers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Method of
estimation
OLS Fixed
Effect
OLS OLS Fixed
Effect
Fixed
Effect
Dependent variable ln wage ln wage residual2
of (2)
residual2
of (2)
residual2
of (2)
residual2
of (2)
education 0.070 0.092 0.015 0.000
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.018)
experience 0.063 0.116 0.002 -0.023
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021)
experience2 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
tenure 0.052 0.032 -0.026 -0.010
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
tenure2 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
self-employed 0.438 0.235 0.237 0.058 0.189 -0.095
(0.173) (0.092) (0.041) (0.214) (0.038) (0.242)
self*educ -0.007 0.011 0.004 0.022
(0.011) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015)
self*exper -0.043 -0.047 0.018 0.001
(0.020) (0.012) (0.021) (0.030)
self*exper2 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
self*tenure -0.054 -0.031 0.019 -0.008
(0.016) (0.009) (0.019) (0.023)
self*tenure2 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 5.566 0.147 0.014
(0.058) (0.009) (0.088)
Observations 23887 23887 23887 23887 23887 23887
Number of ID - 2715 - - 2715 2715
R2 0.31 - - - - -
F statistics 22.35 10.13
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
Note:
1. Standard errors are in parenthesis for coefficient estimates, the p-value is in parenthesis for the F
statistics. For OLS estimates, standard errors and F statistics are corrected for the panel clustering.
2. Dependent variable in the each regression (3) – (6) is the squared idiosyncratic residual of
regression (2).
3. F statistics are for the null hypothesis that the idiosyncratic variance of wage of self-employed
workers is same as salaried workers’.
4. Time dummies are included but coefficients not reported.
 Table 2 Wage determination of salaried worker and future self-employment.
(1) (2)
ln wage ln wage
OLS Fixed-Effect
education 0.070 0.102
(0.003) (0.007)
experience 0.063 0.116
(0.006) (0.009)
experience2 -0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000)
tenure 0.054 0.032
(0.005) (0.003)
tenure2 -0.003 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000)
future self 0.143 0.032
(0.090) (0.071)
fself*educ -0.019 -0.008
(0.006) (0.005)
fself*exp 0.033 0.021
(0.013) (0.010)
fself*exp2 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
fself*ten 0.000 0.001
(0.012) (0.009)
fself*ten2 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 5.497
(0.057)
Observations 20301 20301
Number of ID - 2648
R-squared 0.32 -
Note:
1. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
2. All the samples are salaried or wage workers.
3. future self (fself) =1 if the worker is self-employed in the future. Mean of this
variable is 0.162.
4. Time dummies are included but coefficients not reported.
Figure 1
Life time utility of each career path and initial human capital
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Note:
SE: Self-Employed workers.
SW: Salary and Wage workers.
Figure 2
Life time utility of each career path and initial human capital
(Numerical Example)
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Wage growth of job stayers and initial human capital
(Numerical example)
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Figure 4
Wage growth of job changer and initial human capital
(Numerical
example)
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Figure 5 Distribution of test scores among SW workers
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Note: AFQT89 is used as a test score. Bandwidth = 6 and Epanechnikov kernel was used to estimate the
kernel density. The distribution of percentile ranges from –5 to 105 because of the bandwidth = 6, actual
distribution of test score ranges from 1 to 99.
Figure 6 Distribution of test scores among SE workers
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Note: Same note applies as figure 5.
